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NOTES AND COMMENTS

res gestae doctrine. However, the res gestae doctrine is not adequate
in cases like the principal case where the application of the Hillmon
rule might have given some potentially valuable information to the
jury.
It is submitted that the North Carolina court should accept the
Hillmon doctrine completely by extending it beyond its present
limited scope in this state to cover such cases as the principal case.
CARL

A.

BARRINGTON, JR.

Mortgages-Absolute Deeds Construed As Security Transactions
In Isley v. Browmt' the plaintiffs sought to have an absolute deed
of conveyance construed as a security for a debt. The plaintiffs
contended that they had signed the deed with the understanding
that the defendant, the grantee under the deed, would pay off an
indebtedness and allow them to repay him in monthly installments.
On appeal to the supreme court a judgment for the plaintiffs was
reversed (1) because of plaintiffs' failure to allege and prove that
the clause of redemption was omitted by mistake and (2) because of
plaintiffs' negligence in failing to read the instrument of conveyance
before signing it.
Generally, a deed of conveyance, although absolute on its face,
will be construed as a mortgage if it is given as security for a debt
and if the property was intended by the parties to stand as security.2
In the majority of jurisdictions this rule follows upon proof that the
parties intended a security transaction. 3 However, North Carolina
has long required, in addition to proof of an intent to create a security, that it be shown that the clause of redemption was omitted
by reason of ignorance, mistake, fraud or undue advantage. Moreover, the former had to be shown by facts and circumstances dehors
the deed.'
In the principal case the Court, in giving its first reason for
reversal, stated that in order for the grantor of the absolute deed to
N.C. 791, 117 S.E.2d 821 (1961).
'See, e.g., Hill v. Day, 231 Ark. 550, 331 S.W.2d 38 (1960). See generally Annot., 79 A.L.R. 937 (1932); Note 26 N.C.L. REv. 405. (1948).
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See, e.g., Newell v. Pate, 264 Ala. 644, 89 So. 2d 170 (1956).
'See, e.g., Perkins v. Perkins, 249 N.C. 152, 105 S.E.2d 663 (1958) ; for
cases prior to 1939, see Notes, 26 N.C.L. REv. 405 (1948); 16 N.C.L. REv.
416 (1938). See also Jones v. Brinson, 231 N.C. 63, 55 S.E.2d 808 (1949)
(parel trust); Williams v. Joines, 228 N.C. 141, 44 S.E.2d 738 (1947)
(action for specific performance).
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have it converted into a security for a debt "it must be alleged and
proven that the clause of redemption was omitted by reason of
ignorance, mistake, fraud, or undue advantage. This must be established by proof of declarations and proof of facts and circumstances,
5
dehors the deed, inconsistent with the idea of an absolute purchase."
This statement of the required proof departs materially from the
former requirement in three respects. First, it apparently eliminates
the necessity of proving intent.6 Secondly, it requires the omission
of the redemption clause to be established by proof of declarations
and proof of facts and circumstances dehors the deed. Heretofore,
this was the requirement for proving intent.7 Thirdly, it requires
proof of a declaration and of facts and circumstances outside the
deed. The Court had previously only required proof of facts and
circumstances outside the deed." Nevertheless, as the Court cites
and appears to rely upon prior decisions stating the double requirement of proving intent to create a security and that the clause of
redemption was omitted by reason of ignorance, mistake, fraud or
undue advantage, apparently it merely mistated the rule in the principal case. 9
The trial court submitted the following issue to the jury: "Did
the defendant obtain the deed to the property . . . by reason of the

ignorance or mistake of the plaintiffs, the fraud of the defendant, or
undue advantage of the plaintiffs, taken by the defendant?" ' 10 The
jury answered the question in the affirmative. Although this jury
finding would seem to support the issue of mistake, the form of the
issue submitted renders it impossible to determine whether they
found all, several, or just one of the elements encompassed within
the alternatively framed issue. From the contradictory testimony
they could have found mistake on the part of the plaintiff, mistake
on the part of the defendant in giving the plaintiffs the wrong instru5253 N.C. at 792, 117 S.E.2d at 823.
' It would seem to follow that upon proper proof of omitting the redemption clause the intent to make a security transaction could be implied, but the
old rule expressly required proof of two things. See Perkins v. Perkins,

249 N.C. 152, 105 S.E.2d 663 (1958).

'Davenport v. Phelps, 215 N.C. 326, 1 S.E.2d 824 (1939); Note, 16
N.C.L. REv. 416 (1938).
' In previous cases using the phraseology declarations,facts, and circumstances, the Court held that intent could not be proved by simple declarations
of the parties, but bad to be established by facts and circumstances.

v. Perkins, 249 N.C. 152, 105 S.E.2d 663 (1958).
' Perkins v. Perkins, supra note 8.
10 253 N.C. at 792, 117 S.E.2d at 822.
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ment to sign, mistake on the part of both parties, or even fraud in the
factum" on the part of the defendant. On the basis of the court's
treatment of the issues raised, a trial court would be well advised to
submit and have the jury pass specifically and individually on the
elements of mistake, fraud or undue advantage. The separation of
the different elements of the submitted issue and individual determination on each by the jury would have greatly aided the plaintiffs
and also the court by pointing to what was specifically proved to
the jury.
The second reason the court gives for reversing appears to invoke
a form of estoppel against the plaintiffs for their failure to read the
instrument they signed. The Court stated, "The duty to read an
instrument or to have it read before signing it, is a positive one, and
the failure to do so, in the absence of any mistake, fraud, or oppression, is a circumstance against which no relief may be had, either
at law or in equity."12 The soundness of this rule could not be
seriously questioned, but it would seem to have no application to the
principal case for two reasons. First, it is to be noted that the
plaintiffs specifically relied upon fraud and mistake as grounds for
relief and the jury found fraud and mistake in the alternative issues
it affirmatively answered in favor of the plaintiffs."3 Secondly, the
plaintiffs admitted the ability to read but specifically alleged and
sought to show that they were not of sufficient intelligence to understand the difference between an absolute deed and a mortgage. No
mention of this allegation was made except that the plaintiffs had
the duty to read, apparently even if it would be futile from the point
of understanding.'
The facts of the principal case would seem to demand the intervention of equity regardless of the taut rules of law involved. Here
a man of little education, of less than moderate means, is faced with
a variety of expenses and pending foreclosure of his home. After
ten years of buying and building, he is supposed to have sold all his
rights therein for $100 to the defendant, a successful businessman,
" The Court dealt exclusively with the point of mistake and ignored the
issue of fraud which the plaintiffs relied upon as heavily at trial and on
mistake.
appeal as they did
12253 N.C. at 793, 117 S.E.2d 823.
81d.
i at 792, 117 S.E.2d at 822.
"In Streator v. Jones, 10 N.C. 423 (1824), the grantor was unable to
read or write; the court found gross inadequacy of price, oppression and
financial distress and granted relief.
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when the value of the land is almost $1700 and the amount owing
is less than $600. It would be difficult to imagine the parties meeting on more unequal terms. Although at law a "'pepercorn' of
consideration is sufficient to support a promise," equity may inquire
further."
The harshness of the North Carolina rule is further illustrated
by what must be termed an exception to or an inconsistency with the
old double requirement. Under the old rule the grantor in order to
have the deed reformed had to allege and prove that the clause of
redemption was omitted by mistake, fraud, undue advantage or
undue influence. On the other hand, a creator of such grantor can
have the same absolute deed declared void upon the mere showing
of an intent to create a security. The deed, as to such creditor, is
upset on the ground that it is improperly recorded and would therefore tend to defraud, delay and hinder him.' If the security of titles
is of such paramount importance it should demand the application
of the double requirement here.' 7 Yet the distinction in the two
situations would tend to indicate that implied fraud on the grantor's
creditors is more serious than any proven fraud upon the grantor.
It is submitted that this inconsistency in standards is unjustifiable.
The majority of jurisdictions require either by legislative i s or
1 Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure, II, 20 N.C.L. REv. 341, 357
(1942). "With respect to value, mere inadequacy of price is of no more
weight in equity than at law. If a man who meets his purchaser on equal
terms, negligently sells his estate at an undervalue, he has no title to relief
in equity. But a court of equity will inquire whether the parties really did
meet on equal terms; and if it be found that the vender was in distressed
circumstances, and that advantages was taken of that distress, it will avoid
the contract." Wood v. Abrey, 3 Madd. 417, 56 Eng. Rep. 558 (1818).
1" Under the registration statutes the deed cannot be registered as an
absolute deed for it was not so intended; nor can it be registered as a mortgage for it does not purport on it face to be one. Foster v. Moore, 204 N.C.
9, 167 S.E. 383 (1932). This difference in standards has led to the suggestion of an indirect method of securing the desired relief. See Note, 26 N.C.L.
REv. 405, 406 (1948).
17 Certainly "titles to property, which ought to be evidenced by solemn
instruments in writing," should not depend on the slippery memory of witnesses. Clement v. Clement, 54 N.C. 184, 186 (1854). However, there seems
to be more justice in allowing a man the opportunity to recover his home
and property than securing property titles, especially when he contends he
never intended to convey, the circumstances seem to negate the idea of an
absolute sale, and there is no third party involved.
"sSee e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 47, § 136 (1958) ; IDAHo CODE §§ 45-904,
-905 (Supp. 1961) ; MicHr. STAT. ANN. § 26.549 (1953). Two jurisdictions
require the grantor to retain possession. GA. CODE § 67-104 (1957) ; Miss.
CODE § 272 (1942). Several jurisdictions seek to protect third parties in this
situation. E.g., N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 320. Contra, MD. CODE ANN.
art. 66 § 1 (1957) ; PA. STAT. ANN. § 21-951 (1955).
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judicial action, that the plaintiff show by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that there was the intent to create a security transaction. These statutes allow the reformation of conveyances to
conform to the intent of the parties while, at the same time protect-

ing the interest of any third parties.
It is submitted that the North Carolina legislature should adopt
a statute similar to the California statute which provides that a
conveyance will be deemed a mortgage if intended as security regardless of the omission of a clause of redemption or defeasance. 20

T. LA FONTINE ODOM
10

Zivotosky v. Max. 75 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1947) (Sup. Ct. 1947), af'd, 92
N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1949). No statute or decision has been found similar to North Carolina's double requirement.
0 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2929.
A man's ignorance or financial oppression
should not be allowed to fatten the purse of those who seek a "bargain" by
such circumstances. The defendant stated on cross examination that "if he
wanted to sell me a piece of property, I see no reason-if you can buy at a
bargain, I'll buy a bargain anywhere." Record, p. 83, Isley v. Brown, 253

N.C. 791, 117 S.E.2d 821 (1960).

